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IN T R O D U C T IO N
The liability of state highway departments and of highway personnel 
for defective highway design, construction, and maintenance is a difficult 
area of the law to state in hard and fast rules. It is not that the basic 
concepts are difficult to understand, rather it is that they are difficult to 
apply to given factual situations. It is my intention today to highlight a 
few of the major principles applicable to suits against the state or public 
official for negligence or defects in the design, construction, or mainte­
nance of highways. Because a suit against a public official or employee 
in his personal capacity is an alternative open to plaintiffs and is similar 
in principle, I want to discuss and compare it to suits against the state. 
Before discussing specifically the areas of design, construction, and main­
tenance, I want to give you some background information.
BACKGROUND IN F O R M A T IO N
As you may know, the suit for negligence against the state highway 
department is a fairly recent development. Early in our history Ameri­
can courts held that states had sovereign immunity from suit that could 
only be waived by legislative consent. Today, many states permit, in one 
way or another, an action against the state for negligence in the per­
formance of certain public functions, including highway operations.
Because of this doctrine of state immunity in the past, many litigants 
were compelled to find another means of redress in the courts for injuries
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caused by highway defects. Claimants as a second choice were relegated 
usually to suing the highway official or employee in his personal capacity 
for negligent conduct of his duties.
Several distinctions exist between personal liability and state liability. 
First, because the state acts through its agents and employees, state lia­
bility is based on the doctrine of respondant superior; that is, the master 
is liable for the acts of his servants. I t follows that where the public 
employee performs a negligent act that does not fall within the excep­
tion to liability the state agency may be held liable in a tort suit.
The law of public official and employee personal liability, on the 
other hand, does not apply the doctrine of respondant superior to officials 
and employees. For example, a supervisor may not be held personally 
liable for the negligent acts of his subordinates. The supervisor would 
be accountable only if he personally participated in the negligent conduct 
or was negligent in the selection of the employee.
Moreover, it may be noted that the public official or employee is not 
protected by any umbrella of state or sovereign immunity. In the 
absence of statute, the general view is that the public official or employee 
may be held personally liable for his negligence even though the state is 
immune from suit or liability for the negligence of its agents.
The two areas of law are similar in that the courts have developed 
certain rules or tests to limit liability to those areas in which it is 
thought proper to impose liability for negligent conduct. Neither the 
liability of the state nor of the public official is determined exactly in 
the same manner as if the suit were brought against a private person or 
corporation. Thus, states and officials or employees, although there are 
exceptions, are generally held not liable for performing negligently their 
discretionary functions or activities, or, to put it another way, for per­
forming duties that require the exercise of judgment and discretion. 
Where state officials or employees are involved, the general rule is that 
they are not liable for negligence committed during the exercise or 
performance of an official duty discretionary in nature. The rule of 
privilege does not apply, however, if the official was acting out of malice, 
committing an intentional tort, exceeding his jurisdiction or acting out­
side the scope of his employment (such as by trespassing on the property 
of another). Similarly, where the state is sued for negligence in the 
conduct of highway operations, the prevalent defense is that the depart­
ment is not liable for negligence in the conduct of certain discretionary 
functions or duties.
The term discretion is not an easy one to define. Any activity in­
volves the exercise of discretion, but here it means the power and duty
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to make a choice among valid alternatives; it requires a consideration of 
alternatives and the exercise of independent judgment in arriving at a 
decision or in choosing a course of action. Discretionary acts are those 
in which there is no hard and fast rule as to a course of conduct that 
one must or must not take. On the other hand, ministerial duties are 
more likely to involve clearly defined tasks not permitting the exercise 
of discretion. Ministerial acts are those performed with minimum 
leeway as to personal judgment and do not require any evaluating or 
weighing of alternatives before the undertaking of the duty to be 
performed.
There are several reasons for these rules that result in conditional 
immunity of the state or the public employee. As you know, under the 
separation-of-powers doctrine in this country, each coordinate branch 
of government is vested with certain powers and responsibilities. Be­
cause of this separation of powers, the courts are reluctant to second- 
guess discretionary decisions made by executive bodies; otherwise, the 
judiciary would be usurping the role of executive departments. More­
over, the courts are thought in certain cases to lack the necessary 
expertise to make some judgments that are entrusted to expert bodies 
having specialized knowledge and understanding of the problems in 
their own area. The courts share the view that to subject public agen­
cies to general liability for errors or defects in the plan or design of 
public improvements such as highways would result in the submission 
of the propriety, adequacy, and sufficiency of the design to the judgment, 
not of competent and skilled engineers, but of a jury of untrained 
laymen.
Reasons that the courts are reluctant to impose personal liability on 
a public official or employee are that the public agent, in sharp contrast 
to a private person, has a duty to act and execute his responsibilities, and 
the vigorous action needed on the part of public officials and employees 
to carry out public functions would be seriously impaired if all actions 
that they are required to perform were subjected to personal liability.
In sum, the courts are balancing two policies: On the one hand, the 
need for orderly administration of governmental functions, and, on the 
other, the need to compensate victims of injuries resulting from the 
negligent performance of government functions. In order to perform 
this balancing, the common law formulated the discretionary-ministerial 
test in the area of personal liability that was later applied in negligence 
suits brought against the state.
It may be noted, too, that a number of states have tort claims acts. 
These acts constitute a waiver of immunity from suit and liability with
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certain exceptions. Although these acts differ from state to state, they 
are modeled on the federal tort claims act that was enacted in 1946. 
One common feature of the tort claims acts is the inclusion of a provi­
sion immunizing the state or public entity from suit arising out of the 
performance of certain discretionary functions. The exclusion is based, 
of course, on the discretionary-ministerial test developed by the court 
in the law of personal liability.
In those states having a tort claims act with a discretionary function 
exemption, the term discretion has been interpreted more narrowly than 
in other states applying the common law. Discretionary acts are really 
discretionary only where there is a determination of policy based on a 
consideration of policy-type factors. Usually, such discretion is exercised 
only at the “planning level.” Even though some discretion may be 
involved in lower, operational-level decisions, courts generally hold that 
discretion exercised below the planning level is not an exercise of dis­
cretion within the meaning of the statutes. Moreover, some courts hold 
that once immune discretion is exercised at the planning level, the dis­
cretion is exhausted and any negligence in the execution of the decision 
may result in liability.
H IG H W A Y  DESIGN L IA B IL IT Y
Let’s first consider the extent to which highway design is discre­
tionary and immune from liability. It has been generally held that the 
actual plan and design of a highway are protected from liability because 
they are functions that involve the exercise of discretion and judgment. 
Neither states and state agencies nor public officials and employees are 
liable for errors of judgment in planning and designing public improve­
ments. Where actions have been brought against public officials, states, 
or highway departments, it has been held, for example, that there is no 
liability for an injury arising out of a highway plan or design having a 
defectively designed traffic light, curve, curbs, drain, culvert, intersection, 
medians, shoulders, safety islands, crosswalks, or highway exits. Simi­
larly, suits against highway personnel have held that the elevation of 
grade, erection of guard rails, and installation of culverts and traffic 
control devices are immune from liability, because they are all decisions 
requiring the exercise of independent judgment and discretion after a 
consideration of traffic requirements.
The general rule, therefore, is that public entities are protected from 
liability where the claim arises out of a defectively designed highway. A 
leading illustration of that principle is Weiss v. Fote, a New York case, 
where it was alleged that the Board of Safety of the City of Buffalo
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had approved a traffic light with too short a clearance interval; that is, 
not enough time was allowed for east-west traffic to clear the intersection 
before north-south traffic was green-lighted. The court held, however, 
that the adequacy of the design of this traffic light could not be sub­
mitted to a jury for a determination of the negligence of the city.
The court stated:
“Lawfully authorized planning by governmental bodies has a 
unique character deserving of special treatment as regards the extent 
to which it may give rise to tort liability. I t is proper and necessary 
to hold municipalities and the state liable for injuries arising out of 
the day-by-day operations of government— for instance, the garden 
variety injury resulting from the negligent maintenance of a high­
way—but to submit to a jury the reasonableness of the lawfully 
authorized deliberations of executive bodies presents a different 
question. To accept a jury’s verdict as to the reasonableness and 
safety of a plan of governmental services and prefer it over the 
judgment of the governmental body which originally considered and 
passed on the matter would be to obstruct normal governmental 
operations and to place in inexpert hands what the legislature has 
seen fit to entrust to experts."
There are exceptions to this general rule of immunity for design 
defects. Some courts hold that liability for defective design may be 
imposed if the defect is one of such a character as to be apparent to 
anyone of ordinary intelligence and judgment; others hold that the 
defect must be one that was “obviously dangerous” at the time of its 
approval, or “manifestly dangerous,” or “obviously and palpably danger­
ous.” Another jurisdiction holds that for the state to be liable for a 
design defect, it must be one that renders the highway totally out of 
repair from the very beginning.
An example of a design defect in which the court held the public 
entity liable is Paul v . Faricy. The court held that a traffic island was so 
negligently designed at its inception that it was obviously and palpably 
dangerous to the ordinarily prudent man of reasonable intelligence. In 
that case, the defendant’s vehicle struck the inclined apron of a safety 
island intended to be used by pedestrians for boarding other vehicles. 
The front of the safety island facing the on-coming traffic consisted of a 
concrete apron about 15 ft. long which at its extreme westerly end was 
10 in. high and which gradually increased to a height of 2 ft. above the 
pavement at its easterly end. Adjoining the easterly end of the apron 
stood a concrete bumper block or pier which rested upon but was not 
anchored to the pavement.
64
This block, in which traffic lights were imbedded, was 4 ft. high, 
about 3 I/2 ft. wide, and 2 ft. thick and weighed approximately 4,200 lb. 
The apparent purpose of the entire design was to protect pedestrians 
standing on the safety island, as well as occupants of automobiles collid­
ing with the safety island, in that the concrete apron by its sloping 
design would slow down a colliding automobile before it was stopped 
by the 4,200-lb. bumper block.
Of course, the inevitable happened—the 11-year-old plaintiff was 
standing on the safety island when the car, driven by Faricy, hit the 
concrete apron, continued forward and upward onto the apron until it 
struck the unanchored bumper block, which by force of the impact 
tipped over onto the platform and struck the plaintiff.
The court noted that the general rule was governmental immunity 
for defects in the plan or design of highways, that the plan was consid­
ered and approved by the appropriate body, that a competent engineer, 
after having examined a number of traffic islands, had designed this 
island, and that there were some differences in opinion on designing and 
building a traffic island. However, the city was held liable on the basis 
that there was no reasonable necessity for the obvious danger presented 
by the unanchored 2-ton block. The court asked:
“W hat could be a more palpable source of danger to pedestrians, 
than an unanchored block weighing two tons and equipped with a 
ramp to direct the force of colliding automobiles at a point above 
its center of gravity? As a safety measure, it violated the most 
elementary laws of physics and presented a danger that must have 
been apparent to any reasonably prudent man. Those who are 
charged with the responsibility of exercising a bona fide judgment in 
matters of structural design are entitled to place great reliance upon 
the advice of an expert but such expert advice may not be used as 
a shield to justify a failure to perceive a defect that is wholly 
unnecessary and which is not only apparent but is so obviously and 
palpably dangerous that no reasonably prudent man would approve 
its adoption.”
Insofar as immunity for design defects is concerned, the case of 
Smith v. Cooper held flatly that state employees are generally immune 
from liability for alleged negligence in planning and designing high­
ways. In Smith certain officers and employees of the Oregon State 
Highway Commission were alleged to have been negligent in designing 
a tight unbanked curve, painting a center stripe to indicate that traffic 
was to continue straight ahead, failing to post signs warning of the 
dangerous condition of the road, and failing to erect a guardrail at the 
edge of the turn where the fatal accident occurred.
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The court held, however, that these allegations charged conduct by 
the executive branch of the government that should not be reviewed by 
the judicial branch. The court noted that that the decisions that were 
made to do or not to do these things were dependent upon considera­
tions that a court or jury should not consider, particularly by hindsight, 
such as the funds available for the project, the amount of additional 
land necessary to make a more gradual curve, the cost of the land, the 
loss of the land for recreational or agricultural purposes, the amount and 
kind of traffic contemplated, and the evaluation of traffic and safety 
technical data. In Smith however, the court suggested that gross negli­
gence in highway design would not be immunized; for example, officials 
could not design a road to end at the edge of a cliff.
A troublesome question concerning design immunity is whether im­
munity, once attached, is perpetual? The general rule is that the rea­
sonableness or adequacy of a plan or design is measured by the standards 
prevalent at the time of its adoption or approval. California, however, is 
one jurisdiction in which design immunity has been held not to be 
perpetual. That is, the state has the duty to review a plan and undertake 
corrective action where changed traffic or other conditions demonstrate 
that a design has become dangerous in actual practice. Although previous 
California decisions had held that design immunity remained intact even 
though changed circumstances had clearly revealed the defects of the 
plan, these precedents were reversed by Baldwin v. State.
In Baldwin, the plaintiff had stopped his pickup truck in the fast or 
inside lane of traffic in order to make a left turn. While stopped there, 
his truck was struck from the rear by another northbound vehicle, and 
knocked into southbound traffic, where the truck collided with another 
vehicle. The plaintiff alleged that the state was negligent in the design 
of the intersection because of the absence of a left-turn lane and of the 
failure to warn of the dangerous condition.
The evidence at trial established that in the preceding 3.7 years, 
42 accidents occurred at the crossing, causing four deaths. Numerous 
requests, reports and studies had been prompted by the intersection 
because of the large increase in traffic since the boulevard was con­
structed in 1942. Despite this showing the state defended on the basis 
that the plaintiff’s action was barred by the state’s design immunity 
statute. The court, however, reversing its earlier position on the 
perpetuity of design immunity, held th a t:
“Having approved the plan or design, the governmental entity 
may not, ostrich-like, hide its head in the blueprints, blithely ignor­
ing the actual operation of the plan. Once the entity has notice that
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the plan or design under changed physical conditions has produced
a dangerous condition of public property, it must act reasonably to
correct or alleviate the hazard.”
Of the other states that have considered the question, New Jersey, 
in a comment to its design immunity provision has stated that design 
immunity is perpetual; Kansas courts hold that design must be judged 
by the standards in existence at the time of the plan’s adoption. One 
New York decision suggested that there is a duty on the part of the 
public entity to correct a highway design if it is shown later that 
changed conditions have rendered the design hazardous in actual use. 
Although a few jurisdictions (California or New York) may require 
the highway department to review a plan or design where there are 
changed conditions, no cases have been found imposing this duty on 
individuals such as highway officials and employees where they are sued 
personally.
H IG H W A Y  C O N ST R U C T IO N  L IA B IL IT Y
Where a claim arises out of negligent highway construction, the 
state will want to defend again as the basis that the negligence is 
immunized because of the discretion vested in the department; however, 
negligent construction is more likely to result in liability.
The cases appear to establish three general rules where a claim 
arises out of negligent construction:
(1) If the plan or design itself dictates the specifications, sched­
ules, or details of the operation.. . .  which, when carefully 
adhered to, give rise to the claim, the discretionary defense is 
applicable;
(2) If there is wrongful deviation from, or negligence in carrying 
out, the design, specifications, schedules, or other details or 
operation set forth in the overall plan, the discretionary de­
fense is not applicable; or
(3) If the overall plan is only general in terms and silent as to 
some details, there is a conflict of view as to whether the 
discretionary defense applies if the remaining details are 
supplied, negligently, at the time of construction.
Three highway cases involving negligent implementation of a plan 
or design are McCauley v . State, a New York case, Cameron v . State, 
a California case, and State v . Abbott, an Alaska decision. In McCauley, 
the decedent skidded through the space between roadside guardposts 
and plunged over a steep bank into a river. The court held that the
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state had a duty to protect against the danger presented by the steep 
bank that was not met where the positioning of the guardposts did not 
conform to the contract plans and were far enough apart to permit the 
decedent’s car to pass between them. Thus, the deviation from a plan 
or design, or the negligent execution or construction of the design, is 
evidence that the state has not exercised reasonable care.
Another exception to design immunity is presented where the high­
way in actual use has a design feature that was not approved in the 
overall plan or design of the highway. In Cameron v. State, plaintiff’s 
automobile went out of control on an S-curve that the court found to 
be a dangerous condition because of an uneven superelevation. The 
state was not protected by its design immunity statute, because the 
uneven superelevation was not an included feature of the highway 
design.
In the case of State v. Abbott, the negligent execution of a policy- 
level decision was not protected or immunized by the discretionary func­
tion exemption in the Alaska T ort Claims Act. Plaintiff was severely 
injured when the car in which she was riding skidded out of control 
on a sharp curve and struck an oncoming truck. At the time of the 
accident, the road was covered with ice and had not been sanded in 
accordance with the state’s standard operating procedure. The court held 
the department liable, because once the state made the decision to 
provide winter maintenance, the program could not be implemented 
negligently. The court stated:
“Once the initial policy determination is made to maintain 
the highway through the winter by melting, sanding, and plowing 
it, the individual district engineer’s decisions as to how that decision 
should be carried out in terms of men and machinery is made at 
the operational level; it merely implements the basic policy decision. 
Once the basic decision to maintain the highway in a safe condition 
throughout the winter is reached, the state should not be given 
discretion to do so negligently. The decisions at issue in this case 
simply do not rise to the level of government policy decisions 
calling for judicial restraint. Under these circumstances the discre­
tionary function exemption has no proper application.”
H IG H W A Y  M A IN T E N A N C E  L IA B IL IT Y
Where a claim arises out of negligent maintenance, the state or 
public official or employee is most likely to be held liable. The cases 
dealing with the maintenance area, however, seem to recognize some 
immunity for maintenance planning where the individual officer or
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employee is sued personally. Thus, where maintenance activity gives 
rise to a claim against a public official or employee, the courts hold that 
the individual is not liable for the exercise of discretion in deciding 
the need for repairs, the time and place of making repairs, the materials 
to be used, or the method of making repairs. The courts have held 
public officials and employees liable for ministerial acts such as leaving 
open culverts across a highway or failing to warn of and guard against 
open excavations. Moreover, the operation of motorized vehicles is 
generally held to be a ministerial function.
As I stated, the discretionary function exemption construed in state 
liability cases is not so broad. Because maintenance planning is not 
thought by the courts to be a true exercise of discretion in the sense 
of evaluating and assessing basic policy factors, the performance of 
maintenance tasks is considered to be low level, operational-level activity. 
It does not matter if the maintenance duties require the exercise of some 
discretion such as the choice of materials to be used or the time of 
making repairs. Thus, states have been held liable for negligence in 
locating road signs and center stripes; for the decision as to the type of 
highway barrier to be used; and for the allocation of men and materials 
required to remove snow and ice from the highway. All were held to 
involve operational-level functions that were not protected by the 
discretionary defense. Because maintenance is viewed as routine house­
keeping, low level, operational-level activity that is not discretionary 
in nature, states are most likely to be held liable for negligent main­
tenance. In sharp contrast, some personal liability cases recognize that 
maintenance planning, like design, involves the exercise of discretion.
SUM M ARY
To summarize briefly, the matter of tort liability of state highway 
departments for design, construction, and maintenance negligence has 
received varying treatment by the courts. Most jurisdictions recognize 
an exemption from liability for negligence in the performance of or 
failure to perform, discretionary activities. Where highway operations 
are at issue, the question often becomes whether the activity or decision 
involved falls within the exemption from liability for discretionary 
functions or duties.
The cases generally hold that the design of a highway is discre­
tionary, because it involves high-level planning activity with the evalua­
tion of policy factors. Moreover, design functions, considered to be 
quasi-legislative in nature, are usually immune from “second-guessing” 
by the courts, which are inexpert at making such decisions. Design
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immunity statutes represent a further effort by legislatures to immunize 
governmental bodies from liability arising out of negligence or errors 
in a plan or design where the same was duly approved under current 
standards of reasonable safety.
The courts have noted exceptions to design immunity: (1) where 
the approval of a plan or design was arbitrary, unreasonable, or made 
without adequate consideration; (2) where a plan or design was 
prepared without adequate care; (3) where it contained an inherent, 
manifestly dangerous defect or was defective from the very beginning 
of actual use; and (4) where changed conditions demonstrate the need 
for additional or remedial state action. The latter duty to review a 
plan or design because of changed conditions has not been applied, to 
my knowledge, thus far in suits against highway officials and employees.
Negligent construction is not likely to be immunized by reason of 
the discretionary defense, particularly where the condition deviates from 
the approved plan or design or where there is negligence in implementing 
the plan or design, such as by introducing a feature never considered in 
the design phase. Construction negligence may be protected from 
liability where the plan or design specifies in detail how a feature is 
to be completed and the specifications, carefully adhered to, give rise 
to the injury.
Negligent maintenance is least likely to be immune from liability. 
Courts tend to consider this phase of highway operations as routine 
housekeeping necessary in the performance of normal day-to-day gov­
ernment administration. Highway maintenance is exercised at the 
operational-level, and even though discretion to some extent is involved, 
the discretionary decisions to be made are not policy-oriented. Only in 
suits against public officials and employees have the courts recognized 
that maintenance planning requires the exercise of discretion.
